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OPINION OF THE COURT
PER CURIAM.
This matter requires us to determine the effect under the New Jersey Constitution
and statutes of Governor James McGreevey’s August 12, 2004 announcement that he will
resign effective November 15, 2004.
Plaintiffs ask us to order the State of New Jersey to hold a special gubernatorial
election.  Under the New Jersey Constitution, such an election is required if there is a
“vacancy” in office.  There is no vacancy here because the Governor has not yet resigned
and because he continues to serve and occupy the office.  Absent a vacancy, no special
election is mandated.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I. Facts
James McGreevey was elected as Governor of the State of New Jersey on
November 6, 2001, and was sworn in January 15, 2002.  He was elected to a four-year
term which expires January 17, 2006.
3At an August 12, 2004 press conference, McGreevey publicly announced his
intention to resign before the completion of his term.  Citing “an adult consensual affair
with another man” which he believed would render the office “vulnerable to rumors, false
allegations, and threats of disclosure,” McGreevey declared “the right course of action is
to resign.”  For the ostensible purpose of facilitating “a responsible transition,”
McGreevey stated that the effective date of his resignation “will be November 15, 2004.” 
McGreevey continues to discharge the powers and functions of the New Jersey
governorship.
The Governor’s stated intention to resign “effective” November 15, 2004 is
significant.  Had McGreevey “vacated” his office prior to September 3, 2004, the New
Jersey Constitution would require that his successor be elected on November 2, 2004.  On
the other hand, if the office is “vacated” after September 3, 2004, the President of the
New Jersey Senate would serve as acting governor until the next elected governor takes
office in January 2006.  The current President of the New Jersey Senate is Richard Codey,
who, like McGreevey, is a member of the Democratic Party.
Plaintiffs Bruce Afran and Carl Mayer, purporting to represent a class of all
registered New Jersey voters, brought this action in federal court on August 16, 2004,
seeking a declaration that Governor McGreevey “vacated” his office under the New
Jersey Constitution; that this “vacancy” requires election of a new governor on November
2, 2004, to serve the remainder of the term; and that McGreevey’s continued occupation
     1Afran v. McGreevey, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2004 WL 2072535 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2004).
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of the Governor’s office infringes plaintiffs’ First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court for the District of New Jersey
denied plaintiffs’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
dismissed their § 1983 action for failure to state a claim.1  Because this case involves only
questions of law, our review is plenary.  Pollice v. Nat’l Tax Funding, L.P., 225 F.3d 379,
388-89 (3d Cir. 2000).  We will affirm.
II. Federal Jurisdiction
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the District Court’s final order
denying Plaintiffs’ motion for declaratory judgment and dismissing the case.  The District
Court properly exercised its federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343.
Federal jurisdiction is proper where plaintiffs assert a non-frivolous federal claim. 
Martin v. United Way of Erie County, 829 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Bell v.
Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)).  Only where the claim upon which federal jurisdiction
hinges is “insubstantial on [its] face” is dismissal for want of jurisdiction required.  Kulick
v. Pocono Downs Racing Ass’n, Inc., 816 F.2d 895, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 542 n.10 (1974)).  Moreover, dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction is only appropriate where “the right claimed is ‘so insubstantial, implausible,
foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not
     2The jurisdictional language of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 tracks the language of 28 U.S.C. §
1983, but each calls for a distinct analysis:
Under either [§ 1331 or § 1343], a court has jurisdiction over the dispute so long as
the plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions violate the requisite federal law: under
§ 1331, any federal law; under § 1343, only laws that relate to civil rights.  Once
the plaintiff has met this threshold pleading requirement, however, the truth of the
facts alleged in the complaint is a question on the merits, as is the legal question
whether the facts alleged establish a violation.  Otherwise, the district court could
turn an attack on the merits, against which the party has the procedural protections
of a full trial including the right to a jury, into an attack on jurisdiction, which a
court may resolve at any time.
Kulick, 816 F.2d 895, 897-98 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70-71 (1978) and Bell, 327 U.S. at 682); see also Fraternal Order of
Police Dep’t of Corrs. Labor Comm. v. Williams, 375 F.3d 1141, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (differentiating standard for dismissing § 1983 claim for lack of jurisdiction from
that applied to motion to dismiss § 1983 claim for failure to state a claim); Taxpayers
United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 295-96 (6th Cir. 1991) (dismissing
action under § 1983 for failure to state a claim despite holding that plaintiffs’ assertion of
a “colorable claim” under § 1983 was sufficient to give rise to federal jurisdiction).
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to involve a federal controversy.’” Id. at 899 (quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of
Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).
In this case, plaintiffs claim they were deprived of their constitutionally protected
right to vote.  Although we conclude that plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under § 1983, this does not deprive a federal court of
jurisdiction.  See Kulick, 816 F.2d at 898; Martin, 829 F.2d at 447.2  Because plaintiffs
allege deprivation of a fundamental right protected by the Constitution, see Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964), federal jurisdiction is proper.
6III. Abstention and Certification
Defendants urged the District Court to abstain from asserting federal jurisdiction in
light of the allegedly unsettled status of New Jersey law, a position plaintiffs– after
opposing it in the District Court– now advance in the alternative to this court.  See R.R.
Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).  The District Court declined to
abstain.  Although we rely upon different reasoning, we agree that abstention is
inappropriate in this case.
The Pullman doctrine authorizes federal court abstention when a constitutional
challenge is intertwined with an ambiguous issue of state law and a likelihood exists,
therefore, that clarification of the state law issue will substantially affect the constitutional
inquiry.  Id.  In order to abstain under Pullman, there must be three “special
circumstances:”
(1) Uncertain issues of state law underlying the federal constitutional claims
brought in federal court;
(2) State law issues amenable to a state court interpretation that would obviate the
need for, or substantially narrow, the scope of the adjudication of the constitutional
claims;
(3) A federal court’s erroneous construction of state law would be disruptive of
important state policies.
Chez Sez III Corp. v. Township of Union, 945 F.2d 628, 631 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing
D’Iorio v. County of Del., 592 F.2d 681, 686 (3d Cir. 1978)) cert. denied, 503 U.S. 907
(1992).  If the court finds these three circumstances, “it must then make a discretionary
7determination as to whether abstention is in fact appropriate under the circumstances of
the particular case, based on the weight of these criteria and other relevant factors.”  Id.
Abstention under Pullman therefore is discretionary and is generally exercised
sparingly.  City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) (citing Colo. River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)); see also Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964) (“The abstention doctrine is not an automatic rule
applied whenever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law; it rather
involves a discretionary exercise of a court’s equity powers.”); Planned Parenthood of
Cent. N.J. v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127, 149 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Pullman abstention should be
rarely invoked”).
Moreover, ambiguity in state law will not, standing alone, require abstention.  As
the Supreme Court stated:
[Pullman abstention] contemplates that deference to state court adjudication only
be made where the issue of state law is uncertain.  If the state statute in question,
although never interpreted by a state tribunal, is not fairly subject to an
interpretation which will render unnecessary or substantially modify the federal
constitutional question, it is the duty of the federal court to exercise its properly
invoked jurisdiction.  Thus, “recognition of the role of state courts as the final
expositors of state law implies no disregard for the primacy of the federal judiciary
in deciding questions of federal law.”
Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 535 (1965) (quoting England v. La. State Bd. Med.
Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415-16 (1964)) (citations omitted).
Principles of comity and federalism counsel for a state constitutional interpretation
by state courts.  But the state law which controls our decision is not uncertain. 
8Furthermore, the discretionary analysis in this case must be informed by considerations of
timing, as well as the policy disfavoring forum-shopping.  Were we to abstain, a final
judicial determination would be substantially delayed.  In a time-sensitive environment
such as that presented by a rapidly approaching election, prejudice to both parties would
inevitably result from such delay.  See Farmer, 220 F.3d at 151 (noting that delay is a
relevant factor in considering whether to abstain).
Moreover, citing an “immense conflict of interest” in an adjudication by the New
Jersey courts, plaintiffs elected to bring suit in federal court.  But having obtained an
adverse ruling on the merits, plaintiffs now– in a reversal of position– argue to this court
that the New Jersey state courts are better suited to resolving this dispute.  We disagree
and hold that Pullman abstention is inappropriate in this case.
Plaintiffs contend in the alternative that we should certify to the New Jersey
Supreme Court the question whether Governor McGreevey’s action effects a vacancy
under the New Jersey Constitution.  Under New Jersey Court Rule 2:12A, the New Jersey
Supreme Court may answer such a question if “there is no controlling appellate decision,
constitutional provision or statute in this State.”  Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules,
R.2:12A (Gann 2004).
 The use of certification “rests in the sound discretion of the federal courts.” 
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).  Moreover,
this court “may not properly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a
9statute,” or a constitutional provision.  Farmer, 220 F.3d at 152 n.12 (quoting Hill, 482
U.S. at 471).  Relying upon the same considerations which inform our decision not to
abstain– timing, feasibility, public policy, and plaintiffs’ choice of forum– we decline to
employ certification in this case.
IV. The Constitutional Claim
Plaintiffs allege they have been deprived of their right to vote under the First,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court
dismissed this claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
To state a claim for violation of § 1983, plaintiffs must allege that defendants,
while acting under color of state law, deprived them of rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.  Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527,
535 (1981) overruled on other grounds, Daniel v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); see also
Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 298 (3d Cir. 2000).  This court’s initial inquiry, therefore,
is whether plaintiffs have “alleged the deprivation of a right that either federal law or the
Constitution protects.”  Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 298 (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S.
137, 144 n.3 (1979)).
The Constitution protects the right of qualified citizens to vote in both national and
local elections.  Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554 (1964) (“It has been repeatedly
recognized that all qualified voters have a constitutionally protected right to vote, and to
have their votes counted.”) (citing Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) and United
     3For this reason, federal courts do not generally meddle in local elections.  See Gamza
v. Aguirre, 619 F.2d 449, 454 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that Section 1983 does “not
authorize federal courts to be state election monitors”).  Indeed, election law disputes
generally lie within the province of the state courts.  See Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84, 86
(2d Cir. 1970) (noting that jurisdiction over local election disputes, “with certain narrow
and well defined exceptions,” remains “in the exclusive cognizance of the state courts”).
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States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915)); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370
(1886) (noting that voting is a “fundamental political right”).  Despite constitutional
protection of the franchise, however, not every imperfection in state and local elections
rises to the level of a constitutional violation.  Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 699
(5th Cir. 1981); see also Forenza v. Rodgers, 633 A.2d 1057, 1059 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1992) (finding the proposition that “not every violation of state election law
constitutes a denial of constitutionally guaranteed rights” to be “well established”).3
But there are exceptions to the general rule that federal courts do not superintend
the administration of local electoral contests.  Where a discrete group of voters suffers a
denial of equal protection, for example, their constitutional rights are violated.  See
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 559-61.  Of relevance to this case, a claim under § 1983 will also
lie where state or local election infractions work a denial of substantive due process rights
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See, e.g., Bonas v. Town of N. Smithfield, 265
F.3d 69, 74 (1st Cir. 2001) (“[I]n those few cases in which organic failures in a state or
local election process threaten to work patent and fundamental unfairness, a colorable
claim lies for a violation of substantive due process”); Duncan, 657 F.2d at 700 (holding
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that “the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prohibits action by state
officials which seriously undermine the fundamental fairness of the electoral process”);
Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1077 (1st Cir. 1978) (“If the election process itself
reaches the point of patent and fundamental unfairness, a violation of the due process
clause may be indicated and relief under § 1983 therefore in order.”); see also Marks v.
Stinson, 19 F.3d 873, 889 (3d Cir. 1994) (enjoining winning state senate candidate from
exercising official authority where absentee ballots were obtained and cast illegally).
We find instructive the decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in
Bonas v. Town of North Smithfield, 265 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2001).  In Bonas, four registered
voters in the town of North Smithfield sought to compel an election in November 2001
for the North Smithfield town council and school committee.  Because a referendum to
transition the town from an odd-year election cycle to an even-year cycle had been
adopted in 1998, and regularly scheduled elections had been held in 1999, the town
decided not to hold a municipal election in 2001.  Invoking § 1983, plaintiffs– who
desired to exercise their right to vote for town council and school committee in 2001–
filed suit in federal district court claiming denial of their constitutional rights.
The court recognized the limited reach of federal jurisdiction over claims arising
from state or local election disputes but held that where the election process is patently
and fundamentally unfair, substantive due process violations can occur.  Id. at 74. 
“[T]otal and complete disenfranchisement of the electorate as a whole,” held the Bonas
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court, is one such instance of patent and fundamental unfairness giving rise to a
constitutional claim.  Id. at 75.
To determine whether such disenfranchisement had in fact occurred, the court
turned to state law:
Do state and local rules mandate an election in North Smithfield for the offices of
town council and school committee in the fall of 2001?  Assuming that such an
election is required...the Town’s refusal to hold it would work a total and complete
disenfranchisement of the electorate, and therefore would constitute a violation of
due process (in addition to being a violation of state law).
Id.; see also Taxpayers United for Assessment Cuts v. Austin, 994 F.2d 291, 295-96 (6th
Cir. 1991) (same).  We employ a similar analytic framework.  Assuming New Jersey law
requires an election in this case, refusal to hold it would rise to the level of a
constitutional violation.
The determinative inquiry, therefore, is whether New Jersey law requires an
election under these circumstances.  As we discuss, we answer that question in the
negative.  Therefore, there is no violation of plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights, and
they have failed to state a claim under § 1983.
V. New Jersey Law
As a threshold matter, the parties vigorously dispute the method of interpretation to
be employed in this case.  Defendants urge this court to rely upon the plain meaning of
the New Jersey Constitution, while plaintiffs suggest an expansive interpretation.
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Plaintiffs rely heavily upon a “liberal” rule of construction they attribute to the
New Jersey Supreme Court’s opinion in New Jersey Democratic Party, Inc. v. Samson,
175 N.J. 178 (2002).  In Samson, Senator Robert Torricelli withdrew his candidacy for
United States Senator approximately five weeks before the November 2002 general
election.  The New Jersey Democratic Party requested Torricelli’s name be taken off the
ballot and replaced with the name of a new candidate.  The applicable New Jersey statute
set forth the procedures for replacement only when the vacancy on the ballot occurred
“not later than the 51st day before the general election.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 19:13-20. 
Regarding vacancies arising within fifty days of the election, however, the Samson court
found the statute silent regarding replacement.  Reasoning that reconfiguration of the
ballots was logistically feasible, and emphasizing its belief that the applicable statute did
not specifically preclude such a remedy, the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted
plaintiffs to insert a new candidate on the ballot.
Significantly, the Samson court construed a New Jersey statute, rather than a New
Jersey constitutional provision.  We decline to apply the “liberal” interpretation urged by
plaintiffs to the state Constitution where there is no indication that the New Jersey
Supreme Court would itself espouse such an approach.  Plaintiffs conceded at oral
argument that the New Jersey Supreme Court has never expressly endorsed a “liberal”
approach to interpretation of the state Constitution.
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Of even greater significance, the New Jersey Constitution–in Article V, section 1,
paragraphs 6 through 9–addresses each scenario generated by a gubernatorial vacancy and
provides means for filling it.  Where the language of a constitutional provision is clear,
the words must be given their plain meaning.  Cambria v. Soaries, 776 A.2d 754, 758
(N.J. 2001) (quoting State v. Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc., 734 A.2d 1160 (N.J.
1999)).  We are mindful of New Jersey’s policy preference in favor of empowering
voters, but we believe the language of the Constitution incorporates this principle within
its text.  Because the Constitution anticipates and provides for succession and election
procedures following a vacancy in the office of the Governor, our textual analysis is
already infused by New Jersey’s preference for electing officials.  Our analysis must
begin with the text itself.
The New Jersey Constitution identifies several ways in which a gubernatorial
“vacancy” may arise, among them resignation.  N.J. Const. Art. V, § 1, ¶¶ 6-8.  Plaintiffs
argue that by virtue of Governor McGreevey’s August 12th announcement, there is a
vacancy in the office of Governor.  Because we find this announcement alone does not
constitute a resignation, we disagree.
The New Jersey Constitution establishes a comprehensive framework by which
unexpected transfers of power in the office of the Governor will take place.  When a
governor resigns, a vacancy arises and the Constitution provides for a provisional
fulfillment of the governor’s duties by the President of the Senate:
     4In Title 19 of the New Jersey Code, which sets forth New Jersey election law,
“general election” is defined as “the annual election to be held on the first Tuesday after
the first Monday in November.”  N. J. Stat. Ann. § 19:1-1.
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In the event of a vacancy in the office of Governor resulting from the death,
resignation or removal of a Governor in office, or the death of a Governor-elect, or
from any other cause, the functions, powers, duties and emoluments of the office
shall devolve upon the President of the Senate, for the time being, and in the event
of his death, resignation or removal, then upon the Speaker of the General
Assembly . . . .
N.J. Const. Art. V, § 1, ¶ 6 (“Paragraph 6”).  
In addition to providing for the immediate assumption of power by the Senate
President, the Constitution also provides that a vacancy in the office of the Governor
will– in some circumstances– trigger a special gubernatorial election:
In the event of a vacancy in the office of Governor, a Governor shall be elected to
fill the unexpired term at the general election next succeeding the vacancy, unless
the vacancy shall occur within sixty days immediately preceding a general election,
in which case he shall be elected at the second succeeding general election; but no
election to fill an unexpired term shall be held in any year in which a Governor is
to be elected for a full term.  A Governor elected for an unexpired term shall
assume his office immediately upon his election.
N.J. Const. Art. V, § 1, ¶ 9 (“Paragraph 9”).4
Reading these two provisions together, it is apparent that the New Jersey
Constitution contemplates the resignation of the governor and subsequent transfer of
power as a three-step process: first, the creation of a vacancy by the governor’s
resignation; second, the assumption of the powers and duties of the Governor’s office by
the Senate President; and third, an election to determine the next governor.  The timing of
     5Should a vacancy occur within the sixty days preceding a general election, a new
governor will be elected at the “second succeeding” general election.  For example, if a
vacancy occurred in October– within the sixty day window immediately preceding a
November general election– a new governor would be elected thirteen months later, at the
next general election.  Second, where a vacancy occurs between 61 and 364 days before a
general election, a new governor will be elected at that next general election to fill the
remainder of the resigning governor’s term.  For example, were a vacancy to arise in
May, an election would be held the following November and the victor would assume the
governor’s office until the next regularly scheduled gubernatorial election– which could
be up to three years later.  And finally, should a vacancy arise during the year of a
regularly scheduled gubernatorial election, a successor would be chosen at that election. 
If a vacancy arises in February of the final year of a governor’s term, for example, a new
governor would be elected for a full term the following November.
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the first step– that is, when the Governor’s office becomes vacant– determines both the
date of the next gubernatorial election5 and the duration of the Senate President’s term as
acting governor.  Unsurprisingly, it is this date of “vacancy” which lies at the center of
the current dispute.  The parties offer competing views.
According to plaintiffs, a vacancy arose in the office of Governor on August 12,
2004, because McGreevey’s public announcement constituted an effective resignation. 
Because this announcement came more than sixty days before the next general election,
they argue Paragraph 9 requires that an election to fill the remainder of McGreevey’s term
be held on November 2, 2004, or– as they stated at oral argument– on a judicially-
determined date in the future.  Defendants, conversely, contend that no vacancy exists
because no resignation has occurred.
     6The New Jersey Constitution provides that a vacancy in the Governor’s office can
arise by virtue of death, removal, resignation, failure to qualify, absence from the state,
impeachment, or inability to discharge the duties of office by reason of mental or physical
disability.  N.J. Const. Art. V, § 1, ¶¶ 6-7.
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We agree with defendants on this point.  Under the New Jersey Constitution, a
vacancy will arise upon resignation.6  Because Governor McGreevey has not resigned,
there is no vacancy.
On August 12, 2004, Governor McGreevey made a declaration that he would
resign from office and that such resignation “will be effective” November 15, 2004. 
Under New Jersey law, he has not taken the steps necessary to translate this
announcement into an official act.
Chapter 14 of New Jersey Code Title 52 sets forth “[m]ethods of resigning from
office” for both elected and appointed officers:
Whenever a state officer holding an office under the appointment of the joint
meeting of the legislature shall be desirous of resigning, he shall present such
resignation in writing under his hand, during the sitting of the legislature addressed
to the joint meeting.  All other state officers desirous of resigning shall send their
resignations, in writing, to the governor.  All such resignations shall be filed in the
office of the secretary of state.  No resignation made in any other way or
pretended to be made, shall be valid.
N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14-10 (emphasis added).
The text of section 14-10 requires that a governor file a written resignation with
the Secretary of State to effectuate his resignation.  After specifying the resignation
procedures to be followed by “a state officer holding an office under the appointment of
     7Elsewhere in the New Jersey Code, the governor is specifically included within the
statutory definition of a “person holding an office in this State.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14-
7(a).
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the joint meeting of the legislature,” the statute uses all-inclusive language requiring that
“[a]ll other state officers” file written resignations with the office of the Secretary of
State.  N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14-10.7  Even though the requirement that resignations first be
sent “to the governor” may be redundant when it is the governor resigning, this does not
defeat application of section 14-10 to gubernatorial resignations.  The governor falls
within the catch-all category of “all other state officers” and his resignation must,
therefore, comply with the terms of the statute.  See id. ( “No resignation made in any
other way or pretended to be made, shall be valid.”).
The submission of a written letter of resignation to the Secretary of State by a
departing governor, in accordance with section 14-10, is an established practice in New
Jersey.  Each of the four New Jersey governors to have resigned in the last 106 years have
submitted a written resignation to the Secretary of State.  In 1898, Governor John W.
Griggs submitted a written letter of resignation to Secretary of State George Wurts.  In
1913, Governor Woodrow Wilson submitted a hand-written resignation to the Secretary
of State so that he could assume the presidency of the United States.  In 1919, Governor
Edge submitted a written letter of resignation to Secretary of State Thomas Martin.  More
recently, in 2001 Governor Christine Todd Whitman tendered a written resignation to
Secretary of State DeForest Soaries.
19
Plaintiffs urge that McGreevey’s public announcement is more “final” than would
be a letter to the Secretary of State under section 14-10.  They posit that “[e]ven if
[McGreevey] theoretically retains the power to stay on and change his decision...the
reality is that he is not changing his mind and he is going.”  The legal reality, however, is
something different.  Under New Jersey law, a resignation is not valid unless it is in
writing and filed in the office of the Secretary of State.  “No resignation made in any
other way or pretended to be made, shall be valid.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 52:14-10.  Plaintiffs
have cited no statutory provision to the contrary, relying instead on the argument that
McGreevey’s public announcement is “functionally far more definitive and final than
would be a letter of resignation quietly and privately delivered to a government official.” 
But the New Jersey legislature has set forth what constitutes a “definitive and final”
resignation.  McGreevey’s announcement has not satisfied these statutory requirements.
By requiring a written filing with the Secretary of State– a clear and concrete
manifestation of resignation– the legislature has assured clarity in the resignation process. 
Because Governor McGreevey has not yet officially resigned from the office of the
Governor, there is no vacancy under the New Jersey Constitution.
VI. Conclusion
In sum, we hold that there is no vacancy in the office of New Jersey Governor
because James McGreevey, the current governor, has not officially resigned from office. 
Because it is the existence of a vacancy which triggers Paragraph 9’s election procedures,
20
no special election is called for by New Jersey law.  Absent a state law requirement that
such an election be held, plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under § 1983 for violation
of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to substantive due process.
For the reasons stated, we will affirm.
